By Ayomide Otitoju
The law is no respecter of emotion — ignorantia juris non excusat — ignorance of the law excuses no one. Yet, there are moments when passion overtakes reason, when a lawyer charged with defending the law instead defends his feelings.
Such appears to be the case of Barrister Aloy Ejimakor, counsel to detained IPOB leader Nnamdi Kanu, whose public appearance at a street protest demanding his client’s unconditional release has stirred ethical debate within the legal community.
Legal analysts argue that Ejimakor’s action breached the professional decorum expected of a lawyer. The courtroom, they say, not the street, is the proper venue for advocacy. When the wig joins the chant, the dignity of the bar is compromised.
Under the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners (RPC) 2023, Rule 33—known as the sub judice rule—prohibits legal practitioners from making extra-judicial statements on matters still before the court. The principle is clear: cases must be argued before judges, not before the public.
By taking part in a public protest, Ejimakor crossed a professional line defined not by politics but by ethics. The act, according to legal experts, amounts to a textbook violation of the sub judice rule—derived from Latin for “under judicial consideration.” Any attempt by a lawyer to publicly influence opinion on a pending case risks undermining both justice and judicial integrity.
Rule 1 of the RPC also underscores the duty of lawyers to uphold the honour of the profession and avoid conduct that brings it into disrepute. The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (LPDC) has reinforced this standard in past rulings, noting that lawyers must not only act lawfully but also act worthily.
Precedents support this position. In 2019, Barrister Kunle Babajide was suspended for making contemptuous remarks on a case before the court. In 2021, Barrister Ebere Nduka faced disciplinary action for conducting a “media trial” that distorted due process. Both cases serve as reminders that freedom of expression does not absolve lawyers from professional responsibility.
In Ejimakor’s case, emotion appeared to overtake restraint. The transition from advocate to activist blurs the sacred line between the temple of justice and the theatre of populism. When lawyers abandon the bench for the crowd, they trade legal argument for agitation.
The integrity of the legal profession rests on discipline, discretion, and decorum. As the Latin maxim audi alteram partem—“hear the other side”—reminds us, justice thrives only in an atmosphere free from prejudice or external influence.
Ultimately, this is not merely about one lawyer or one protest. It is about preserving the sanctity of the legal process. The law, as often said, is a jealous mistress—demanding fidelity to principle, not passion.
When a lawyer becomes a rawyer, justice loses its defender and gains its performer—and in that transformation lies the true tragedy.
